Joint Head Selection and Airtime Allocation for Data Dissemination in
  Mobile Social Networks by Mao, Zhifei et al.
1Joint Head Selection and Airtime Allocation for
Data Dissemination in Mobile Social Networks
Zhifei Mao, Yuming Jiang, Xiaoqiang Di, and Yordanos Woldeyohannes
Abstract—By forming a temporary group, users in mobile social networks (MSNs) can disseminate data to others in proximity with
short-range communication technologies. However, due to user mobility, airtime available for users in the same group to disseminate
data is limited. In addition, for practical consideration, a star network topology among users in the group is expected. For the former,
unfair airtime allocation among the users will undermine their willingness to participate in MSNs. For the latter, a group head is required
to connect other users. These two problems have to be properly addressed to enable real implementation and adoption of MSNs. To
this aim, we propose a joint head selection and airtime allocation scheme for data dissemination within the group using Nash
bargaining theory. Specifically, we consider two cases in terms of user preference on the data to be disseminated: a homogeneous
case and a heterogeneous case. For each case, a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) based optimization problem is proposed. The
existence of optimal solutions to the optimization problems is proved, which guarantees Pareto optimality and proportional fairness.
Next, an algorithm that allows distributed implementation is introduced. Finally, numerical results are presented to evaluate the
performance, validate intuitions and derive insights of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Mobile social networks, data dissemination, airtime allocation, fairness, game theory, Nash bargaining.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MOBILE social networks (MSNs) enable people to sharecontent and communicate without Internet access by
exploiting short-range wireless communication technologies
such as WiFi Direct and Bluetooth [1], [2], [3]. Due to the
nature of intermittent connectivity, MSNs are often regarded
as a special type of delay tolerant network that utilizes
opportunistic contacts among mobile users to deliver data
[4], [5], [6]. Nowadays, people are becoming increasingly
inseparable from their portable smart devices such as smart-
phones. This brings numerous opportunities for people to
form temporary groups to exchange information when their
portable devices are within each other’s transmission range.
In particular, MSNs are promising communication systems
for people in areas where Internet access is unavailable
or too costly. For example, when disasters strike, Internet
infrastructure such as cellular networks are among the first
pieces of critical infrastructure to fail, leaving individuals
disconnected from one another and from vital information
sources [7]. In such scenarios, MSNs will be one of the fastest
and most handy ways to provide digital connection among
individuals.
Over the past years, significant MSN research effort
has been conducted. However, the main focus has been
on routing, data dissemination and community detection,
leaving a fundamental MSN problem nearly completely
untouched, which is local resource management [3]. This
surprising phenomenon is probably due to that for various
types of wireless networks, local resource management has
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been extensively studied, and consequently one could ex-
pect that their existing solutions might be directly applied
or easily extended to MSNs. Unfortunately, this expectation
ignores a fundamental difference between MSNs and other
popular types of wireless or mobile networks. The difference
is that, in the latter cases, there exist base stations (BSs) or
access points (APs) for mobile users to get connected to and
through the Internet, and in such cases, local resource man-
agement, e.g. scheduling the use of airtime among users,
typically implicitly assumes that the BSs or APs are always
willing to serve, and hence considers only user devices in
making the decision.
However, in MSNs, that seemingly unquestionable as-
sumption may not hold, particularly when a user needs
to use her/his smart device to store-carry-forward data for
the others [8]. This is because, a smart device normally has
limited capacities in terms of e.g. energy, storage, processing
and communication. In consequence, local resource man-
agement in MSNs not only should consider the devices with
data to send or receive, but also must not forget the helpers
that contribute additionally in terms of local resources such
as energy and communication to act like BSs or APs to help
the others. This partly explains why research on MSNs has
been progressing for more than one decade but real imple-
mentations and adoptions of MSNs in the public are rarely
seen today: Overlooking the additional costs incurred to the
helper essentially discourages anyone to be helper, which is
a foundation for MSNs to work. Nevertheless, the concept
of MSNs has drawn huge attention of industry besides
academy. Recently, Mozilla and the U.S. National Science
Foundation have been running a contest seeking innovative
solutions to connect people who are disconnected from the
Internet due to disaster or insufficient connectivity [7]. This
provides a great opportunity to work on the missing pieces
in MSN research towards public adoption of MSNs, and
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2motives the work of this paper.
In this paper, we focus on a fundamental problem in lo-
cal resource management, which is airtime allocation among
users in a temporary group formed on the move, since
available airtime is typically limited in MSNs due to user
mobility and short transmission range. The airtime required
for disseminating a piece of data from its source to all the
interested group members depends on its communication
network topology. In this work, we consider that each group
uses a star topology to communicate where one user is
selected as group head to serve like a personal hot-spot
open to the group and manage the group while other users
connect to the head as peripherals1. Such a star form is
simple yet practical2 because it is natively supported by
the most popular off-the-shelf short-range communication
technologies on portable devices, including WiFi Direct [9]
and Bluetooth [10], making the underlying network func-
tionalities transparent to application development.
With star topology, a group head must be selected among
the users. The head needs to forward data for the peripheral
users, and thus spends more battery power than them.
Therefore, it is important to encourage users to be the head.
In addition, since users may have different battery levels
and link capacities, head selection is critical in that it impacts
users’ utilities and the amount of data that can be dissem-
inated with the limited airtime. In the literature, various
fair airtime (or rate) allocation schemes have been proposed
for traditional WLANs and cellular access networks [11],
[12], [13], [14]. However, they all implicitly assume that the
airtime is long enough so that all the data transmission can
be finally completed. This assumption does not generally
hold in MSNs where the contact duration among users is
limited due to user mobility and short transmission range.
In addition, the utility function they use, which is typically
u(x) where x is the allocated airtime (or rate), cannot
characterize the specifics of users in MSNs, including data
dissemination need, preference on other users’ data and
battery level. Furthermore, unlike previous work, the group
head, counterpart of AP in WLANs [14] and BS in cellular
networks [13] respectively, must also be a target of the
airtime allocation, equivalent to the other users connecting
to it. These add more difficulty in designing a fair airtime
allocation scheme for local data dissemination in MSNs.
In this paper, we address airtime allocation jointly with
head selection among a group of users in an MSN, which,
to the best of our knowledge, has never been considered
previously. Since anyone in the group may or may not
(want to) be the head, a game-theoretic approach is naturally
adopted. Specifically, we formulate the problem of joint
head selection and airtime allocation as a Nash bargaining
game. An advantage of using Nash bargaining is that the
solution, if it exists, is known to be Pareto optimal, propor-
1. Group head and peripherals are called group owner and clients in
Wi-Fi Direct terminology [9], and called master and slaves in Bluetooth
terminology [10].
2. Theoretically, mesh topology is also possible for connecting MSN
users in proximity. However, it requires additional functionalities such
as multi-hop routing and topology management implemented on users’
portable devices. Similarly, while wireless channels are broadcast in
nature, using it for applications usually also requires changes to the
applications and the various layers below, to be able to make use of
this feature.
tionally fair, and acceptable by all users. Motivated by this,
we prove the existence of optimal solution to the joint head
selection and airtime allocation Nash bargaining game using
decomposition. In addition, we propose a distributed algo-
rithm for joint head selection and airtime allocation, based
on the decomposition idea. Moreover, numerical results
are presented to provide an overview of the performance,
validate intuitions and derive insights of the proposed joint
head selection and airtime allocation scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce the system model including network
model, dissemination model, incentive scheme, and user
utility function. The Nash bargaining solution (NBS)-based
head selection and airtime allocation scheme is proposed
and studied in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the nu-
merical results. Section 5 presents related work. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
Since there are many notations in this paper, we summarize
them in Table 1 for reader’s convenience.
TABLE 1: Notations.
Notation Description
G User group
N Number of users in G
L Set of all directed links
(i, j) Link that sends data from node i to node j
cij Rate of link (i, j)
Mi Set of data that node i intends to disseminate
γ Unit reward
fi Amount of data node i forwards for other nodes
ui Utility of node i
v(·) Valuation function
g(·) Cost function
di Amount of data i disseminates
bi Amount of data of interests i receives
ei Total energy consumption of node i
ai Head indicator
es unit energy consumption for sending data
er unit energy consumption for receiving data
si Amount of data node i sends
ri Amount of data node i receives
Ei Energy budget of node i
δi Node i’s sensitivity to battery power consumption
xi Airtime for the dissemination of node i’s all data
αi Bargaining power of node i
T Available airtime
xmi Airtime for disseminating node i’s data m
2.1 Network Model
Consider a group3 of users (or nodes) G = {1, 2, ..., N} in an
MSN, which come into contact by opportunity and would
like to disseminate their data to other interested nodes in
this group. The nodes can communicate with each other
by forming a star network (G,L) where L is the set of all
directed links. One of the nodes is selected as the head
of the group while other nodes, referred to as peripheral
nodes, connect to each other through the head. Denote cij
the rate of link (i, j) that sends data from node i to node j.
We assume the links in L may have different rates.
3. We assume nearby groups use different channels for data dissemi-
nation and data transmission on each channel is independent from the
other channels, e.g. in WiFi-Direct.
32.2 Dissemination Model
Denote Mi the set of data that node i intends to share
to other interested nodes in the group during the contact
(There may be some nodes that do not have any data to
disseminate but are interested in other nodes’ data.). Given
that the data of a peripheral node can interest multiple
nodes in the group, the head can intentionally store the data
(or part of the data) once receiving it from the source node
for the first time and then forward it to the rest recipients,
so that the limited airtime can be utilized more efficiently
than directly sending multiple times from the source node
to each recipient.
2.3 Incentive Scheme
Forwarding data for the peripheral nodes will incur a high
cost to the energy, storage, etc., therefore, rational nodes
are not willing to be the head and forward data for others
unconditionally. To encourage nodes to become the head,
we assume there is an incentive scheme such that the
forwarding behavior is rewarded by the system. Note that
the peripheral users do not have to pay to the head for
forwarding their data: In practice, such a reward could be
in various forms such as popularity and/or reputation in
the MSN. For simplicity of analysis, in this paper, we do
not restrict the form of implementing the reward and use
a linear abstract form of rewarding function, i.e., the node
will receive a reward of γ · f if it forwards an amount f of
data for others, where γ is the unit reward.
2.4 User Model
Nodes are effectively autonomous agents, since there is
no network-wide control authority. Each node can decide,
on its own will, whether to join the group and contribute
resources to facilitate data dissemination. In addition, the
node selected as the head contributes more resources than
client nodes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that each
node seeks to maximize its utility from data dissemination
over a contact. Denote ui the utility of node i, it is given
by the valuation of the data it disseminates and the data
of interests it receives, minus the energy cost for send-
ing/receiving data, plus the reward for forwarding data for
others if i is the head:
ui = v(di + bi)− g(ei) + aiγfi (1)
where v(·) is the valuation function, g(·) is the cost function,
di is the amount of data i disseminates, bi is the amount
of data of interests i receives, fi is the amount of data i
forwards for other nodes if it is the head, ei is the total
energy consumption for sending and receiving data, and
ai = {1, 0} is the head indicator. For any node i, ai = 1
means it is selected as the group head while ai = 0 means
it is a peripheral node. Since there will be only one head,
we have
∑N
i=1 ai = 1. Denote e
s and er the unit energy
consumption for sending and receiving data, respectively.
Then we have ei = essi + erri where si is the amount of
data it sends and ri is the amount of data it receives. To
clarify the difference between di and si, and the difference
between bi and ri, an example is illustrated in Fig. 1.
For the valuation function v(·), we assume it is a strictly
concave, positive, and increasing function of di + bi, and
Link
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Fig. 1: Differences between di and si, and between bi and ri.
Node 3 and 4 are interested in node 2’s data A of 5 MB, but
node 1 is not. Since they cannot communicate directly, node
2 will send A to the head, i.e., node 1 first, then node 1 will
forward data A to node 3 and 4. As we can see, the amount of
data node 2 disseminates is d2 = 2 × 5 = 10 MB, while the
amount of data it directly sends is s2 = 5 MB. For node 1, the
amount of data it receives is r1 = 5 MB, while the amount of
data of interests it receives is b1 = 0 MB since it is not interested
in data A.
v(·) = 0 if di+ bi = 0. Function v(di+ bi) = log(1+ di+ bi)
satisfies the above assumptions. Such logarithmic function
has been often used in the literature (e.g., [15], [16], [17])
to model a network user’s satisfaction or evaluation over
certain network resources. For the energy cost function g(·),
we assume it is a strictly convex, positive, and increasing
function of ei, and g(·) = 0 if ei = 0. In addition, each node
i has an energy budget of Ei that can be spent during the
contact period. Clearly, we need to have ei ≤ Ei. Function
g(ei) = δi(
1
Ei−ei − 1Ei ) satisfies the above assumptions,
where δi ∈ [0, 1] is a normalization parameter that indicates
user i’s sensitivity to battery power consumption4. For
example, a user may have high sensitivity when battery
charging is inconvenient. As a rational node will not par-
ticipate in the group if it will become worse off, it requires
ui ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G.
3 NASH BARGAINING TO HEAD SELECTION AND
AIRTIME ALLOCATION
When a number of users come into each other’s proxim-
ity, they create a contact opportunity to form a group to
exchange data with interested ones. Before they can do
that, they have to make a proper decision on head selection
and airtime allocation. Since the users are autonomous and
rational, each of them would like to benefit from the contact
by disseminating its data, receiving data of interests, or
obtaining reward. However, the airtime can be very limited
due to their mobility so that it would be impossible that
everyone gains as much as he/she wants. Therefore, the
final decision of head selection and airtime allocation should
be acceptable to everyone in order to resolve conflicts of
interest. Otherwise, there would be no guarantee that the
group will be formed. For such bargaining problems where
players not only have incentive to cooperate but also have
incentive to oppose each other, Nash bargaining solution
(NBS) is an axiomatic approach that can uniquely identify
an outcome by its four axioms. In this section, we use Nash
bargaining to formulate the problem of airtime allocation
jointly with head selection, and analyze the existence of its
optimal solution. First of all, we review the basics of NBS in
the following section.
4. This cost function is a modified version of that used in [17] which
does not satisfy g(0) = 0.
43.1 Basics of Nash Bargaining Solution
In this section, we briefly review the concepts and results
related to NBS. Consider a bargaining game of N players
who bargain or compete for a share of a limited resource
(airtime in our case). Throughout the game, the players
either reach an agreement on an allocation of the resource
or come into disagreement. Let xi be the share of the
resource that player i gets, x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) is called a
feasible allocation. For each player i, it has a utility function
ui(x) : X → R where X ⊂ RN is the set of all possible
allocations. Denote udi the utility of player i when the
players come into disagreement, ud = (ud1, u
d
2, ..., u
d
N ) is
called the disagreement point. Then a bargaining game can
be formally given by the pair (U ,ud) where U is the set of
all feasible utility vectors u = (u1, u2, ..., uN ).
Let ψ : (U ,ud)→ RN a bargaining solution that assigns
to the bargaining game (U ,ud) an element of U . ψ(U ,ud) is
said to be an NBS if the following axioms are satisfied:
• PAR (Pareto optimality). For any t, t′ ∈ U , if ti >
t′i for all i, then ψ(U ,ud) 6= t′.
• ILT (Independence of Linear Transformations). Sup-
pose that the game (V,vd) is obtained from (U ,ud)
by the transformations vi = σiui + θi, σi > 0 for all
i, then ψi(V,vd) = σiψi(U ,ud) + θi for all i.
• SYM (Symmetry). If U is invariant under the ex-
changes of player i and player j and udi = u
d
j , then
ψi(U ,ud) = ψj(U ,ud), for all possible i, j.
• IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). If
(U ,ud) and (V,ud) are two bargaining games with
V ⊂ U and ψ(U ,ud) ∈ V , then ψ(U ,ud) = ψ(V,ud).
PAR ensures no wastage in the resource. ILT states that the
bargaining solution is invariant with respect to linear utility
transformations. SYM means that if any two players have
the same utility function and disagreement utility, they will
have the same utility in the bargaining solution. IIA says
that if the feasible utility set shrinks, but the bargaining solu-
tion remains feasible in the smaller set, then the bargaining
solution to the game with the smaller utility set should be
the same. The latter three axioms (i.e., ILT, SYM and IIA) are
often regarded as axioms of fairness [18], [19], as they allow
NBS to select a fair allocation among the set of all Pareto
optimal allocations. More details and interpretations of NBS
can be found in [20].
Assuming the utility set U is compact convex and there
is at least one u such that ui > udi for all i, then there
exists a unique bargaining solution fulfilling the above four
axioms, which maximizes the following Nash product (or
Nash welfare) [18]:
N∏
i=1
(ui(x)− udi ). (2)
Though no explicit fairness is defined within the four ax-
ioms, NBS shows strong fairness property. It is well-known
that when udi = 0 for all i, NBS guarantees proportional
fairness (PF) in utility. An allocation that satisfies PF should
be that, moving away from the PF allocation or NBS to any
other feasible allocation will not increase the aggregate of
proportional changes in utilities [21], [22], [23]. In mathe-
matical terms,
∑N
i=1
ui−u?i
u?i
≤ 0 where u? = (u?1, u?2, ..., u?N )
is the PF allocation and u = (u1, u2, ..., uN ) is any other
feasible allocation. Due to such relationship, NBS is often
regarded as a generalization of proportional fairness. By re-
laxing the axiom of SYM [18], [24], the so-called generalized
(or asymmetric) NBS can be obtained by maximizing
N∏
i=1
(ui(x)− udi )αi (3)
where 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 is the bargaining power and
∑N
i=1 αi =
1. Generalized NBS satisfies the axioms of PAR, ILT and
IIA and guarantees weighted proportional fairness which
satisfies
∑N
i=1 αi · ui−u
?
i
u?i
≤ 0 [25].
In the following, we will first elaborate the utility func-
tion of users in the cases of homogeneous user preference
and heterogeneous user preference, model the head selec-
tion and airtime allocation using generalized NBS, and then
discuss the existence of optimal solution for both cases.
The intention of using generalized NBS instead of standard
NBS is to see whether bargaining power allows the head
to be selected to gain higher utility than other users, which
motivates the users to become the head willingly.
3.2 Homogeneous User Preference
Assume the nodes have homogeneous preference on the
data, i.e., they are interested in any data that any other nodes
would like to disseminate. Define a dissemination of the data
of any node i the set of transmissions (or links) that send
i’s data from one node to the other. For a peripheral node,
its dissemination includes the transmission from itself to the
head and N − 2 transmissions from the head to other nodes
in the group. For the head, its dissemination consists ofN−1
transmissions from itself to all the peripheral nodes. Denote
xi the airtime for the dissemination of node i’s data, then
the airtime constraint is given by
N∑
i=1
xi ≤ T (4)
where T is the available airtime. For each node i, we have
0 ≤ xi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Li
zi
ckj
(5)
where zi is the size of all the data inMi and Li is the set of
all the links that disseminate i’s data. The constraint shown
in (5) means that the airtime allocated to i’s dissemination
should not exceed what it needs.
Within the dissemination of any node’s data, we also aim
a fair data distribution among all the transmissions. Ideally,
the progress of all the transmissions of a given dissemi-
nation, defined as the amount of data transmitted, should
be equal when the dissemination stops. Mathematically, we
have
θi = ckjxkj ,∀(k, j) ∈ Li (6)
where θi denotes the amount of data transmitted by every
link in Li and xkj is the airtime for link (k, j) in Li to
disseminate node i’s data. Now we can express the airtime
for sending i’s data via each link in Li in terms of θi:
xkj =
θi
ckj
,∀(k, j) ∈ Li. (7)
5Since ∑
(k,j)∈Li
xkj =
∑
(k,j)∈Li
θi
ckj
= xi, (8)
the amount of i’s data transmitted by each link (k, j) ∈ Li
can be given by
θi =
xi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
. (9)
Then, the amount of data i disseminates within T is given
by
di =
∑
(k,j)∈Li
θi =
Nixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
(10)
where Ni is the number of transmissions in the dissemina-
tion of i’s data in T . Ni = N − 1 if the head has not stored
i’s data, and Ni = N − 2 if the head has. The amount of
data of interests i receives within T can be given by
bi =
∑
h∈G−i
θh =
∑
h∈G−i
xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
. (11)
where G−i = G \ {i} is the set of users in G except i. If i will
be selected as the head, the amount of data i forwards for
other nodes is
fi =
∑
h∈G−i
(Nh − βh) xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
(12)
where βh = 1 means the head has not stored node h’s data
and h needs to send the data to the head, otherwise βh = 0.
For a peripheral node i, it only sends its data to the head,
therefore si =
βixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
. However, for a head i, it not
only sends its own data but also others’ data to all the
interested nodes, therefore we have si = di + fi. Using a
unified expression, we have
si =ai
( Nixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈G−i
(Nh − βh)xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
)
+ (1− ai) βixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
. (13)
In the case of homogeneous preference, we have ri = bi, i.e.,
the amount of data of interests i receives equals the amount
of data i receives. Finally, the total consumed energy of i is
ei = e
s(1− ai) βixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+ er
∑
h∈G−i
xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
+ esai
( Nixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈G−i
(Nh − βh)xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
)
. (14)
Replacing di, bi, fi, and ei in (1) by (10), (11), (12) and
(14), we obtain the utility of any user i shown in (15) at
the bottom of this page. From (15), we can see that ui
is a function of x and a where x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) and
a = (a1, a2, ..., aN ). We assume there is at least one (x,a)
makes ui ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G otherwise nodes have no motivation
to join the group and disseminate their data. Formally, the
generalized NBS for the problem of head selection and air-
time allocation for the case of homogeneous user preference
can be obtained by maximizing the following generalized
Nash product:
max
x,a
N∏
i=1
ui(x,a)
αi (16)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
xi ≤ T (17)
0 ≤ xi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Li
zi
ckj
, ∀i ∈ G (18)
ui(x,a) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ G (19)
ei ≤ Ei, ∀i ∈ G (20)
ai = {1, 0}, ∀i ∈ G (21)
N∑
i=1
ai = 1. (22)
Under the generalized NBS framework, a higher general-
ized Nash product means a better decision of head selection
and airtime allocation. In our case, users’ utilities are zero
at the disagreement point since they will get nothing if no
group is formed. Eq. (17) represents the airtime constraint
for all the group members. Eq. (18) states that the airtime
allocated to the dissemination of any user’s data should be
nonnegative and not be longer than the maximum airtime
required. Eq. (19) ensures individual rationality. Eq. (20)
limits the energy consumption of each user to its energy
budget. Finally, Eq. (21) and (22) indicate that only one of
the users would be selected as the group head.
The problem (16) has at least one optimal solution.
The proof of this statement is skipped, because in Section
3.3 below, a more general case, the heterogeneous case, is
studied. For this more general case, it will be proved with
details that the same statement holds, as shown in Theorem
1, for the more generalized problem (32) that corresponds to
the problem (16) here.
3.3 Extension To Heterogeneous User Preference
The above model applies to MSN systems where users are
interested in the same data. However, in some MSN systems
(e.g., publish-subscribe systems), users may be interested in
different data. In this section, we extend the above model to
cases with heterogeneous user preferences.
Consider that there could be multiple data in Mi. Let
Lmi be the set of links that disseminate node i’s data m.
Denote xmi the airtime for disseminating i’s data m. Then
ui =v
( Nixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈G−i
xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
)
+ aiγ
∑
h∈G−i
(Nh − βh) xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
− g
(
er
∑
h∈G−i
xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
+ es(1− ai) βixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+ esai
( Nixi∑
(k,j)∈Li
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈G−i
(Nh − βh)xh∑
(k,j)∈Lh
1
ckj
))
(15)
6the total airtime xi for disseminating i’s data is
∑Mi
m=1 x
m
i
where Mi = |Mi| is the number of data in Mi. Then the
airtime constraint is given by
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
xmi ≤ T. (23)
For each node i and its data m, we have
0 ≤ xmi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
zmi
ckj
(24)
where zmi is the size of data m. The total amount of data i
disseminates is
di =
Mi∑
m=1
Nmi
xmi∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
(25)
where Nmi is the number of transmissions in the dissem-
ination of i’s data m. Denote Bi the set of nodes that
disseminate data to i (or equivalently the set of nodes that i
is interested in their data). The amount of data of interests i
receives is
bi =
∑
h∈Bi
∑
m∈Mhi
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
(26)
whereMhi is the set of h’s data sent to i. If i will be the head
after selection, the amount of data it forwards is
fi =
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
(Nmh − βmh )
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
(27)
where βmh = 1 means the head has not stored h’s data m
and h needs to send m to the head, otherwise βmh = 0. The
amount of data i sends is given by
si =ai
( Mi∑
m=1
Nmi
xmi∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
(Nmh − βmh )
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
(28)
+ (1− ai)
Mi∑
m=1
xmi β
m
i∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
.
For a peripheral node i, we still have ri = bi. However, for
the head, it does not hold, since it may receive some data
of no interest and only for forwarding. Then the amount of
data i receives is
ri =ai
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
xmh β
m
h∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
+ (1− ai)
∑
h∈Bi
∑
m∈Mhi
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
. (29)
Finally, the total consumed energy of i is
ei =(1− ai)
(
es
Mi∑
m=1
xmi β
m
i∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
+ er
∑
h∈Bi
∑
m∈Mhi
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
+ ai
(
es
( Mi∑
m=1
Nmi
xmi∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
(30)
+
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
(Nmh − βmh )
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
+ er
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
xmh β
m
h∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
.
Replacing di, bi, fi, and ei in (1) by (25), (26), (27), and
(30), we obtain the utility of any user i shown in (31) at
the bottom of this page. Formally, the generalized NBS for
the problem of head selection and airtime allocation for the
case of heterogeneous user preference can be obtained by
maximizing the following optimization problem
max
x,a
N∏
i=1
ui(x,a)
αi (32)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
xmi ≤ T (33)
0 ≤ xmi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
zmi
ckj
, ∀i ∈ G,m ∈Mi (34)
ui(x,a) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ G (35)
ei ≤ Ei, ∀i ∈ G (36)
ai = {1, 0}, ∀i ∈ G (37)
N∑
i=1
ai = 1. (38)
Constraints (33) to (38) have the same meaning with con-
straints (17) to (22), respectively. Assuming there is at least
ui =v
( Mi∑
m=1
Nmi x
m
i∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
+
∑
h∈Bi
∑
m∈Mhi
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
+ aiγ
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
(Nmh − βmh )
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
− g
(
(1− ai)
(
es
Mi∑
m=1
xmi β
m
i∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
+ er
∑
h∈Bi
∑
m∈Mhi
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
+ ai
(
es
( Mi∑
m=1
Nmi
xmi∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
(31)
+
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
(Nmh − βmh )
xmh∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
)
+ er
∑
h∈G−i
Mh∑
m=1
xmh β
m
h∑
(k,j)∈Lmh
1
ckj
))
7one (x,a) makes ui ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists at least one optimal solution to op-
timization problem (32) for joint head selection and airtime
allocation.
Proof. In fact, the optimization problem (32) has two levels
of optimization. At the lower level, each user i in the group
solves a sub-problem (a local generalized NBS problem) that
finds optimal airtime allocation among all the users when
user i is the head. At the higher level, we have a master
problem that chooses the best i to be the head, which gives
the highest generalized Nash product.
Mathematically, the sub-problem for each user is given
by
max
x
N∏
i=1
ui(x)
αi
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
xmi ≤ T
0 ≤ xmi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
zmi
ckj
, ∀i ∈ G,m ∈Mi (39)
ui(x) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ G
ei ≤ Ei, ∀i ∈ G.
where a is fixed and ui is only a function of x. Since v(·)
and −g(·) are strictly concave functions, by the concavity
preserving rules in [26], we can see that ui is a strictly
concave function in x. Since the function of log is concave
and monotonic, the objective function of problem (39) is
equivalent to [18]
max
x
N∑
i=1
αi log ui(x) (40)
It is easy to see that (40) is strictly concave and the con-
straints in (39) are convex. Additionally, we have assumed
that there is at least one feasible point, meaning the con-
straint set is non-empty, therefore there exists a unique op-
timal solution to problem (40) and equivalently to problem
(39) [26].
At the higher level, the master problem is
max
a
p?(a)
s.t. ai = {1, 0}, ∀i ∈ G (41)
N∑
i=1
ai = 1
where p?(a) = max
x
∏N
i=1 ui(x)
αi is the optimal objective
value of problem (39) for a given a (namely, a given user
being the head). Since there will be only one ai equals 1
and the rest are 0, the objective of the master problem (41)
is essentially finding the largest within N real numbers,
which always exists. The pair(s) (x,a) resulting in the
largest number will be the optimal solution(s)5 to the whole
problem.
5. Strictly speaking, there might be multiple maximum in N real
numbers. Therefore, we do not claim uniqueness of the optimal so-
lution.
Remark 1: In the above proof, we show that there is
a unique optimal solution to each local generalized NBS
problem (39), meaning the axioms of PAR, ILT and IIA pre-
sented in Section 3.1 are satisfied in maximizing each local
generalized NBS problem. Note that the master problem is
just finding the user giving the highest generalized Nash
product among all users. Suppose user i is finally selected
as the head, then the final optimal airtime allocation will be
the optimal airtime allocation to the local generalized NBS
problem of user i, which satisfies the axioms of PAR, ILT
and IIA. Therefore, no matter which user is selected as the
head, the axioms of PAR, ILT and IIA are always satisfied.
Remark 2: Letting m = 1 and Bi = G−i, we can see
that it reduces to the model for the homogeneous case. In
other words, the homogeneous case is a special instance of
the heterogeneous case. Therefore, Theorem 1 holds for the
homogeneous case as well.
3.4 Algorithm
Based on the idea of decomposition in the proof of Theorem
(1), we present an algorithm that can find a unique optimal
solution in a distributed fashion. First of all, each node i
solves problem (39) with ai = 1. Since problem (39) is a
convex optimization problem with inequality constraints,
its optimal solution can be found by interior point methods
[26]. After solving the problem, node i sends the optimal
results (x?)i and (p?)i, i.e., the optimal airtime allocation
and generalized Nash product given i is the head, to all
other nodes in G. Once receiving the optimal results from
all other nodes, each node i checks which node being the
head will result in the largest generalized Nash product.
If node i happens to have the largest generalized Nash
product, it will become the group head and (x?)i will be the
final optimal airtime allocation. It is possible that multiple
nodes have the largest generalized Nash product and any
such node can be the head. In such cases, the node with the
lowest index will be selected as the head without loss of
generality6. The above steps is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Joint Head Selection And Airtime Allocation
Output: (x?,a?)
1: for i ∈ G do
2: Solve problem (39) with ai = 1 to get (x?)i and (p?)i
3: Send (p?)i to all other nodes in G
4: while receiving (p?)k from all k 6= i ∈ G do
5: if i = min{argmax
k∈G
(p?)k} then
6: set ai = 1 and x? = (x?)i
7: else
8: set ai = 0
9: end if
10: end while
11: end for
6. Certainly, there are other approaches to determine the final group
head, such as selecting the node with the highest battery power.
Actually, in the numerical results, it will be shown that user with high
energy budget is preferred to be the head if we do not specifically select
them.
8TABLE 2: Utilities of the users with different users being the head when user 1’s budget is 300 Joules.
Sensitivity δ = [0, 1, 1, 1] δ = [1, 1, 1, 1]
Candidate head User 1 User 2 User 3 User 4 User 1 User 2 User 3 User 4
u1 3.9155 3.7973 3.7973 3.7973 3.9029 3.7935 3.7935 3.7935
u2 3.7954 3.9122 3.7954 3.7954 3.7950 3.9121 3.7951 3.7951
u3 3.7948 3.7948 3.9103 3.7948 3.7944 3.7946 3.9102 3.7946
u4 3.7948 3.7948 3.7948 3.9103 3.7944 3.7946 3.7946 3.9102
GNP 214.0044 213.9364 213.8605 213.8605 213.2454 213.6849 213.6091 213.6091
GNP is short for generalized Nash product. Each colored value is the highest GNP among all four values and implies
that the corresponding user is selected as the head.
3.5 Handling Dynamics
Once the group members are known to all, Algorithm 1
will be applied to select a proper head and allocate airtime
to each user. In practice, node mobility would introduce
dynamics to a formed group, such as node leaving and
joining. To cope with such dynamics, we presume a group
management function is implemented at each node, which
allows the head on duty to update group information peri-
odically. Once an event (e.g., a new node joins) is detected,
the head on duty will inform other users to start a new
round of head selection and airtime allocation by applying
Algorithm 1.
4 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate how the NBS-based ap-
proach to the joint head selection and airtime allocation
problem performs. Particularly, we show the impacts of
different parameters such as energy budget, unit reward
and link capacity on the behavior of the proposed approach.
The tools used in solving the optimization problems and ob-
taining the results are AMPL7 jointly with MATLAB. In the
utility function of users, we use v(di+ bi) = log(1+ di+ bi)
as the valuation function and g(ei) = δi( 1Ei−ei − 1Ei ) as the
cost function.
4.1 Setup
We consider a set of 4 nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} that are in proxim-
ity with each other8. We assume that the communication
technology they use is Wi-Fi Direct which supports star
network topology [9]. Since it is built on traditional Wi-Fi
infrastructure mode, Wi-Fi Direct can achieve typical Wi-
Fi speeds. In a recent experimental study we conducted,
it is found that the network is able to provide an average
capacity of more than 4 MB/s (equivalent to 32 Mb/s)
for local data dissemination [27]. We consider an average
energy consumption of 2.85 Joule/MB for both sending
and receiving via Wi-Fi Direct [17]. At the beginning of the
contact, each user has one data to share with others and the
size of each data is 10 MB (e.g., a short video clip or high-
definition photo). The available airtime T is 20 seconds.
7. A powerful tool that can solve high-complexity optimization prob-
lems. (www.ampl.com)
8. Though the number of users is few, the most fundamentals are re-
vealed. Evaluation with more than four users has also been conducted,
with the same observations.
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Fig. 2: Results of airtime allocation and head selection when
δ = [1, 1, 1, 1].
4.2 Energy Budget and Sensitivity to Energy Con-
sumption
Hereafter, we use budget and sensitivity to represent energy
budget and sensitivity to energy consumption respectively.
We set user [2, 3, 4]’s budget to [500, 400, 400] Joules and
vary user 1’s budget in {50, 100, 300, 500} Joules to see how
head selection and airtime allocation are affected. We also
consider two types of sensitivity, i.e., δ = [1, 1, 1, 1] where
all the users have the highest sensitivity and δ = [0, 1, 1, 1]
where user 1 is insensitive because e.g., it has a power bank.
In addition, the users have the same bargaining power and
unit reward is set to 0.01. Fig. 2(a) shows the selected heads
and airtime allocated to the dissemination of each user’s
data with varying budget of user 1 and δ = [1, 1, 1, 1]. In
the figure, "H" above a bar is short for ‘head’ and implies
that the corresponding user is selected as the head. When
the budget of user 1 is 50 Joules, only 12.25 s out of 20
s is allocated. The reason is that the NBS-based approach
guarantees fairness in utility. As can be seen from Fig. 2(b),
the utilities of all the users are rather close except that the
utility of the head is slightly larger than others (the reason
will be explained in Section 4.3). Fig. 2(c) shows that the
budget of user 1 will be totally utilized when it is 50 Joules.
Therefore, if all the 20 s is allocated, only the utilities of user
[2, 3, 4] will increase while user 1’s utility will not, which
is not fair. However, this does not necessarily mean that
the NBS-based approach is inefficient. On the contrary, it
9provides fairness in utility within each execution, the rest
available time will be allocated among user [2, 3, 4] in the
next execution and fairness is guaranteed among them.
Fig. 2(a) also shows that the user with the highest budget
is always selected as the head, provided that their sensi-
tivities are the same. This seems reasonable since the head
consumes significantly more energy than others, as shown
in Fig 2(c). However, if the sensitivity of user 1, i.e. δ1, is
zero, user 1 will become the head when its budget is 300
Joules which is smaller than user 2’s budget. This is because
the cost δ1( 1E1−e1 − 1E1 ) in its utility function is always zero
no matter how much energy is consumed. Table 2 shows
that, when user 1 is the head, the utility of user 1 and that
of user 2 is respectively larger than that of user 2 and that
of user 1 when user 2 is the head. As a result, user 1 being
the head has larger generalized Nash product than user 2
being the head does. However, when user 1’s budget is 100
or 50 Joules, it is not selected as the head simply because
its budget does not support to utilize the whole 20 s and
therefore leads to low utility for all the users.
4.3 Unit Reward
Fig. 2 and Table 2 have shown that the selected head can
have higher utility than other users. Especially, it holds no
matter which user is finally selected as the head in the
examples shown in Table 2. The form of utility function (1)
implies that the forwarding reward to the head might be
the cause. To study its impact on users’ utility, we vary the
unit forwarding reward γ in [0, 0.02]. In addition, we let all
the users have the same budget 500 Joules and the same
sensitivity 1.
Fig. 3 shows, on one hand, that the utility of the head
(user 1) increases with the unit reward. However, when
there is no reward or the unit reward is too small, i.e. in
[0, 0.0012], the utility of the head is lower than that of other
users as shown in the small window in Fig. 3. In such cases,
user 1 may not be very willingly to be the head. When the
unit reward is high enough, the head can gain a higher
utility than other users. On the other hand, the utilities
of the peripheral users (user 2, 3, 4) also increase with the
unit reward but slower than that of the head does and stop
increasing when the unit reward is 0.013 and higher. Fig. 4
illustrates the airtime allocated to the users’ disseminations.
It can be seen that higher unit reward motivates the head
to allocate more airtime to other users until the ‘others-first’
point where all the airtime is allocated to the other users
and it get zero airtime for the dissemination of its own
data. From that point where γ = 0.013 onward, increasing
unit reward will not change the airtime allocation anymore,
and the peripheral users will not be able to disseminate
or receive more data. This explains why their utilities keep
unchanged when γ = 0.013 and higher in Fig. 3.
In summary, a higher unit reward certainly motivates
the users to be the head. However, a higher unit reward
does not necessarily motivate the head to forward more
data for others due to the existence of the others-first point.
Therefore, a unit reward lying between zero and the others-
first point is recommended in real application, which can
not only make a trade-off between disseminating the head’s
data and disseminating the peripheral users’ data, but can
also control the gap between the users’ utilities.
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4.4 Bargaining Power
It is expected that a user’s utility increases with its bar-
gaining power. Fig. 5 shows the utilities of the users with
increasing bargaining power of the head. In a loose sense,
the expectation is reasonable. However, with a higher unit
reward, the head seems less keen on obtaining longer air-
time for its own data (as can be seen from Fig. 6), since a
higher unit reward already allows it to achieve much higher
utility than others. From another point of view, changing
the bargaining power is less effective than changing the
unit reward to control the gap between the users’ utilities.
Especially when the unit reward is high (e.g., γ = 0.02),
even the bargaining power of the head is much smaller than
that of others, it still have much higher utility than others.
Nevertheless, increasing the bargaining power of the head
enables the head to obtain a higher utility than other users
even when there is no reward for forwarding (i.e. γ = 0).
4.5 Data Load
Larger data load means that longer airtime is required to
complete the dissemination. To investigate whether data
load affects head selection and airtime allocation, we vary
the data load of user 1 from 2 MB to 20 MB and keep
others’ data load fixed to 10 MB. Table 3 shows the head
selection under three different bargaining power settings.
We can see that when the bargaining power of user 1 is
lower than or equal to that of others, the selected head
does not change with user 1’s data load. However, when the
bargaining power of user 1 is very high (i.e., 1013 ), the final
head is changed from user 1 to user 2 when the data load of
user 1 becomes larger than that of others. To find the reason
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Bargaining Power of The Head
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ai
rti
m
e 
(s) . = 0
. = 0.01 . = 0.02
Head
Peripheral Users
Fig. 6: Airtime allocated to each user with varying bargaining
power.
behind such a change, the airtime allocation with bargaining
power [ 1013 ,
1
13 ,
1
13 ,
1
13 ] is plotted in Fig. 7. It can be seen that
if user 1 is the head, the airtime allocated to itself increases
linearly with its data load. As a result, the gap between the
utility of user 1 and that of other users increases with user
1’s data load, as can be seen in Fig. 8. Larger utility gap gives
smaller generalized Nash product and thus is regarded less
fair by generalized NBS. That is why user 2 is selected as
the head by generalized NBS when user 1 has a larger data
load than others.
TABLE 3: Head selection with different data load of user 1.
Bargaining power Data load of user 1 (in MB)
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Fig. 7: Airtime allocated to each user with varying data load of
user 1. The green dotted line with user 2 being the head shows
the airtime allocated to user 3 and 4, while the red dotted line
is the airtime to user 1.
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4.6 Link Capacity and User Preference
In practice, links in the same network may have different
capacities and users may have different preferences on
the data. In the following, we consider that the links are
symmetric (i.e., cij = cji) and their capacities are shown
in Fig. 9. Each of users 1, 2, and 3 has one data (i.e., A1,
A2, and A3 respectively) to share while user 4 has two data
A(4, 1) and A(4, 2) to share. We consider four cases of user
preference: case 1 – homogeneous preference, case 2 – user
1 is not interested in user 4’s data A(4, 1), case 3 – user 2 is
not interested in A(4, 1), and case 4 – both user 1 and 2 are
not interested in A(4, 1).
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Fig. 9: Link capacity (in MB/s).
Table 4 shows the results of head selection and the total
amount of data disseminated for the four cases. Different
from the case of identical link capacity, where the total
amount of data disseminated does not change no matter
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TABLE 4: Head selection and the amount of data disseminated within T for the four cases (In the table, GNP and TAoD are short
for generalized Nash product and total amount of data disseminated within T respectively.).
Candidate head Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4GNP TAoD GNP TAoD GNP TAoD GNP TAoD
User 1 138.7956 55.3846 138.7956 55.3846 138.7956 55.3846 138.7956 55.3846
User 2 70.5070 32.7273 70.5070 32.7273 70.5070 32.7273 70.5070 32.7273
User 3 138.7956 55.3846 138.7956 55.3846 150.4951 59.2308 140.7025 56.1538
User 4 70.5070 32.7273 70.5070 32.7273 84.2542 39.0909 83.2800 37.2727
Selected head User 1 User 1 User 3 User 3
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Fig. 10: Airtime allocation for different user preferences.
which user is the head, we can see that the selected head for
each case is the one that can disseminate the highest amount
of data among all four candidate heads. Fig. 10 shows the
results of airtime allocation for the four cases. Before giving
the explanation, we define average dissemination rate (ADR)
of a given data m of user i to be the total amount of this
data that has been disseminated to all interested users per
second. Mathematically, it can be written by
ADRmi =
Nmi∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
1
ckj
(42)
where Nmi is the number of users that are interested in
the data. If the ADR of a data is higher, more bits of the
data can be disseminated within the same airtime. It can be
seen from Fig. 10(a) that in case 1, where the users have
the same preference on all the data, the peripheral users are
allocated the same airtime for their data’s dissemination.
Additionally, the airtime to user 4 is shared by its two data
equally. In comparison, user 4’s data A(4, 1) in case 2 does
not get any airtime for its dissemination. The reason is that
its ADR is relatively lower than that of any other data,
as shown in Table 5. Therefore, allocating more airtime to
other data rather than A(4, 1) would contribute more to all
users’ utilities. For the same reason, A(4, 1) in both case 3
and 4 is allocated long enough airtime so that it is totally
disseminated, as can be seen in Fig. 10(b).
TABLE 5: The average dissemination rates of all the data for
the four cases.
Data Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
A1 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692
A2 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692
A3 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692
A(4, 1) 2.7692 1.8461 3.4285 3
A(4, 2) 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692 2.7692
4.7 Adaptive Head Selection and Airtime Allocation
The joint head selection and airtime allocation scheme pre-
sented in Section 3 assumes that the link capacities are
constant during the contact. In reality, however, the link
capacities may change with time-varying wireless channel
condition and node mobility. In this section, we show how
the scheme can be easily made adaptive to scenarios with
time-varying link capacity and present numerical results for
this adaptive scheme.
The adaptive joint head selection and airtime allocation
scheme is described as follows. Assume time is slotted with
slot size pi and while the link capacity between two nodes
may change over different slots, it remains constant within
each slot. At the beginning of each slot t, the group of users
perform a round of head selection and airtime allocation by
solving the following slot-wise optimization problem:
max
x,a
N∏
i=1
uti(x,a)
αi (43)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
xmi ≤ pi (44)
0 ≤ xmi ≤
∑
(k,j)∈Lmi
zmi
ckj
, ∀i ∈ G,m ∈Mi (45)
ui(x,a) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ G (46)
ei ≤ Ei, ∀i ∈ G (47)
ai = {1, 0}, ∀i ∈ G (48)
N∑
i=1
ai = 1. (49)
uti(x,a) is a slot-wise utility function for the users, which is
expressed as
uti(x,a) =v
(
dti(x) +
t−1∑
k=1
dki + b
t
i(x) +
t−1∑
k=1
bki
)
(50)
−g
(
eti(x,a) +
t−1∑
k=1
eki
)
+ aiγf
t
i (x) +
t−1∑
k=1
rwki
where dki , b
k
i , e
k
i , and rw
k
i are the amount of data dissemi-
nated, the amount of data of interest received, the amount
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TABLE 6: Head selection for the ideal case with different slot sizes for the adaptive scheme.
Slot size Head user in each slot of the duration (20) No. of times each user being the headUser 1 User 2 User 3 User 4
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Fig. 11: Results for the ideal case with different slot sizes for the adaptive scheme.
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Fig. 12: Comparison between the adaptive scheme and the non-adaptive scheme. Results for the adaptive scheme are marked
with "-a" after slot sizes.
of energy consumed, and the reward gained by user i in the
kth slot, respectively. The amount of airtime to be allocated
is the size of this slot and thus the summation of the airtime
to be allocated is no greater than the slot size.
To study the impact of the slot size on the results of head
selection and airtime allocation, we consider an ideal case
where energy budget, sensitivity, bargaining power, data
load, link capacity and data preference are the same for
all the users. From Table 6, we can see that the users take
turns to be the head when the slot size is small. As a result,
the energy consumption of the users with smaller slot size
are more balanced than that of the users with larger slot
size, which can be seen from Fig. 11(a). This result coincides
with the idea of periodic clusterhead rotation [28], [29] in the
clustering schemes for energy-constrained networks such as
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in order to balance energy
usage. In addition to energy consumption, the amount of
reward and the amount of data disseminated (AoD) of the
users are also quite even when the slot size is small. Though
small slot size can balance specific costs and gains such as
energy consumption and reward, from Fig. 11(d), it seems
that frequent slotting also results in low user utilities and
low generalized Nash product.
In the following, we consider that the link capacities
may vary over slots. We compare the adaptive scheme and
the non-adaptive scheme that selects a head and allocates
airtime only at the beginning of the contact regardless of link
capacity changes. For each link, we assume it is a Rayleigh
fading channel. For such a channel, its capacity c has the
following probability density function (PDF) [30]
p(c) =
ln(2)
ρ
· 2c · e−(2c−1)/ρ, c ≥ 0 (51)
where ρ represents the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
Fig. 12(a) shows that all users together consume more
energy by using the adaptive scheme than using the non-
adaptive scheme9. It implies that the adaptive scheme better
utilizes the limited airtime by adapting the head selection
and airtime allocation to link capacity changes: it allows
users to disseminate more data (Fig. 12(c)) and gain more
reward (Fig. 12(b)) in total within the contact. More impor-
tantly, Fig. 12(d) shows that users can obtain higher utilities
in general and thus higher generalized Nash product.
5 RELATED WORK
Existing protocols on data dissemination in MSNs (e.g.
[31], [32], [33], [34]) mostly focus on selecting proper data
9. To make the comparison reasonable, we have used a fixed value
for ρ here.
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carriers, i.e. whether users should exchange data when they
meet, while how data is exchanged after they decide to
exchange data is often neglected or simplified. The major
reason is that previous studies on MSNs predominantly
assume that nodes contact with each other in a pairwise
manner. And this assumption makes problem arising in
data exchange, such as airtime allocation, seemingly trivial
and therefore overlooked by previous studies. However,
simultaneous multiple contact is quite common in many
cases such as conference, underground, and tourist sites.
This viewpoint is supported by a recent study on real-world
contact traces [35]. Clearly, group communication among
multiple contacting nodes can be more efficient than pair-
wise communication for content dissemination if multiple
users are in contact. And the problem of airtime allocation
for content dissemination within a group is nontrivial.
Since the network setting is basically the same, our work
is quite related to airtime (or rate) allocation in WLANs and
cellular access networks [11], [12], [13], [14]. However, head
selection is out of the picture in these studies, because the
head, i.e. access point in WLANs or base station in cellular
networks, is provided by the service provider as part of the
infrastructure. As a result, airtime allocation in these studies
is only among users connecting to the AP or BS, while in
our work, the head, like other users connecting to it, also
competes for a share of the airtime. Another major difference
between our work and airtime allocation in WLANs, cellular
networks as well as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) is
that we incorporate user’s different preference on data in
the user utility. Disseminating a piece of data does not only
contribute to the utility of the data disseminator but also
contribute to the utilities of all interested receivers. This
social property has not been considered in previous studies
on airtime allocation in WLANs, cellular networks or mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs). In our earlier work [36], we
propose a fair airtime allocation scheme for group data dis-
semination based on NBS. However, this scheme assumes
the group head is already selected, and does not characterize
user specifics including data dissemination need, preference
on data, energy cost, etc. In this study, we jointly address the
problems of head selection and airtime allocation, and in-
corporate the user preference on data, energy consumption,
and forwarding reward into the NBS models.
In the literature of multihop wireless networks such
as WSNs [37] and MANETs [38], head selection is often
addressed together with cluster formation. The purpose of
such joint consideration is to control network topology so
that the network nodes can joint force to achieve some
specially targeted common objectives such as environment
monitoring in an optimized manner (e.g. optimal energy
efficiency and coverage). In all such studies, an underlying
assumption is that nodes will follow such network-wide
coordination to decide their roles and contribute. However,
in MSNs, nodes are not intentionally deployed and they can
have different interests. In addition, in MSNs, users move
freely and decide if to join and what role (as group head
or peripheral) to play in a group on their own will. For
this reason, we have left cluster formation out of the scope
of our work. Nevertheless, since for each cluster or group,
head selection and airtime allocation are still necessary pro-
cesses, our proposed scheme may be adopted after cluster
formation has been performed.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, for local resource management in WSNs, we
investigated airtime allocation among users of a group.
Taking into consideration the unique characteristic of MSNs
that the potential head also has to be counted in the al-
location, the decision of airtime allocation has been per-
formed jointly with head selection. To model this joint
problem, a game-theoretic approach was proposed, and a
Nash bargaining problem was formulated. We proved that,
for both considered cases, i.e. a homogeneous case and
a more general heterogeneous case, the NBS problem has
at least one optimal solution, which ensures an acceptable
outcome by all participating users with several properties of
the NBS solution, including Pareto optimal and proportion-
ally fair. In addition, we introduced a decomposition-based
algorithm to find a unique optimal solution to the allocation
problem, which allows being implemented in a distributed
fashion. Through the numerical results, we found that the
outcome of the head selection and airtime allocation scheme
is affected by many parameters. Notably, the scheme prefers
user with high energy budget, low sensitivity to energy
consumption, and high dissemination rate to be the head.
In addition, the reward for forwarding data for others can
have significant impact on the allocation.
We highlight that, in the modeling and analysis of the
problem, some specific simple forms of the reward, utility
function and energy consumption function have been used.
In addition, in modeling the cost incurred to the correspond-
ing user, we have only considered battery energy consump-
tion for simplicity. Nevertheless, the essentials of the airtime
allocation and head selection problem in MSNs are mostly
revealed. For instance, the problem is so unique that existing
optimal or fair airtime allocation schemes for use in classical
WLANs and cellular access networks are not applicable or
do not hold their initial design properties in MSNs. A future
research direction is to consider other cost models for the
head and other probably more general reward and utility
functions in deciding the allocation. In addition, in this pa-
per, we have considered a practical group topology, the star
topology, where all communication has to go through the
head that functions likes a personal WiFi hotspot. Another
direction for future research is to study airtime allocation
for MSNs based on mesh networking. In such a case, the
problem is similar to that for ad hoc networks [39], [40],
[41], [42], [43], but more complex because of special MSN
characteristics such as airtime limitation, incentive / reward
involved, and heterogeneous user preference on data.
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